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Abstract
In the philosophical tradition, the notions of determinism and causality are
strongly linked: it is assumed that in a world of deterministic laws, causality may
be said to reign supreme; and in any world where the causality is strong enough,
determinism must hold. I will show that these alleged linkages are based on mis-
takes, and in fact get things almost completely wrong. In a deterministic world that
is anything like ours, there is no room for genuine causation. Though there may be
stable enough macro-level regularities to serve the purposes of human agents, the
sense of “causality” that can be maintained is one that will at best satisfy Humeans
and pragmatists, not causal fundamentalists. 
Keyword: causality, natural laws, determinism, nomic necessity.
Introduction
There has been a strong tendency in the philosophical literature to conflate
determinism and causality, or at the very least, to see the former as a particularly
strong form of the latter. The tendency persists even today. When the editors of the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy asked me to write the entry on determinism, I
found that the title was to be “Causal determinism”.1
I therefore felt obliged to point out in the opening paragraph that determinism
actually has little or nothing to do with causation; for the philosophical tradition has
it all wrong. What I hope to show in this paper is that, in fact, in a complex world
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such as the one we inhabit, determinism and genuine causality are probably incom-
patible with each other. After we see why this is so, we can appreciate better the dif-
ferent metaphysical options available to philosophers hoping to understand the
complex issues concerning laws of nature, causality, and physical theory.
At first blush it should seem strange to be told that determinism and genuine
causality are incompatible.2 After all, let’s consider a simple possible world gov-
erned by Newtonian mechanics, consisting of nothing but a box with rigid walls,
and a few billiard balls inside colliding elastically with the walls and with each
other. This possible world is surely deterministic (none of the pathological elements
of Newtonian physics are permitted, here)3, and what could be a more standard
example of cause-effect relations than that old cliché, billiard-ball collisions?
Accepting these claims for a moment, what this shows is just that in very simple,
idealized worlds, determinism may be able to coexist with genuine causality. My
target is to consider a very different kind of possible world: namely, a world as rich
and complex and apparently-irregular as ours is. We will see what problems are
brought by this richness and complexity, below. 
But surely there is more to say in favor of the compatibility of determinism and
causality than just our toy billiard-ball-world example? In fact, isn’t one precise
way of presenting determinism this: If the world is governed by deterministic laws,
then an[y complete] earlier state of the whole world may be considered a sufficient
cause of a[ny] later state of the world, in all details. If this isn’t genuine causality,
then what is? 
But this isn’t genuine causality, in anything remotely like the senses of “X
caused Y” or “P’s cause Q’s” that we employ in everyday life or in science. First,
consider that in all reasonable examples of deterministic theories we have in hand,
the determinism is bi-directional: future states of the world entail past events com-
pletely, as well as vice-versa. Yet it strains the notion of “cause” past the breaking
point, to say that we should consider the state of the world 1 billion years from now
as the cause of all our current events and actions. (Here, by the way, we see one rea-
son why our billiard-ball world should be accepted as causation-bearing only with
some hesitation: the physical laws give us no reason to think that “ball A struck ball
B, giving it a new direction and momentum” is more correct than the time-inverse
of the same process, “ball B struck ball A, causing it to change its direction and
momentum”.4 If we, as human observers, were watching the billiard balls, we
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3 We will help ourselves to global energy conservation (and any other extra laws we may need)
to rule out determinism-wreckers such as space invaders. See Earman (1986) for details.
4 Huw Price (1996) reminds us forcefully that physics does not seem to tell us that one of these
descriptions is the “right” way of looking at the events; either one is as good as the other. I will large-
ly avoid the issues of philosophy of time that arise if we explore these remarks further, however.
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would surely single out one of these as the “correct” description (i.e., the one
matching our internal sense of time-order). But then, with humans in it, this would
no longer be a simple world, nor could it be one with Newtonian laws.)
Getting back to complete states of the world, we need not insist on bi-direction-
al determinism in order to see why the relations between them are not relations of
causation. For as we will see shortly, the relationships are ones of entailment,
whereas causation is traditionally seen as a metaphysical but non-logical relation-
ship. The temporal distance between states of the world can also be chosen to be
quite large: the complete world-state of 1 billion years ago entails the events of
today’s world-state just as well as yesterday’s does, yet it contains none of the facts
or events that we might intuitively take to be causes of today’s events. Finally, the
relationships between complete states of the world lack a certain robustness that we
normally attribute to cause-effect relations. If my phone call at 4:00 a.m. woke my
sister (caused her to wake up), we normally suppose that my calling at 4:00:01
would have done the same, or that my calling in the presence of a housefly on the
wall near me (actually there was none) would have done the same, too. But if we
add a housefly to the state of the world a billion years ago, or move some event by
1 second, the “butterfly effect” tells us that arbitrarily large changes in the world-
state now might be the result. For all these reasons (and others I will not mention),
it is not right to see the entailment relations between states of the world as cause-
effect relations.
So determinism by itself is no form of, nor guarantee of, genuine causation in
the sense that interests us. But are they not at least compatible? Over the next few
sections we will see why they are not. Before that, we need to clarify both deter-
minism and genuine causation. 
Determinism: The world is deterministic if and only if, given a specified way
things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.
“Fixed as a matter of natural law” means simply that the specification of how
things are (everywhere) at time t, together with the laws of nature, jointly logico-
mathematically determine a single possible future for the world. Notice that I have
only defined the determination relation to be past –> future, so as to make the doc-
trine as weak as possible while still deserving the name. But we should bear in mind
that the existing theories in physics that are deterministic, or close to it, are all the-
ories in which the logico-mathematical determination works as well from later –>
earlier as it does in the customary direction.
Determinism is only a conceptual possibility for our world if we take seriously
that the world may be “governed” by fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature;5
no-laws metaphysical views such as are held by Cartwright (1999) and other post-
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fundamentalists rule out determinism without further ado. Such philosophers will
agree with me that determinism can’t hold in a world like ours, and a fortiori can-
not coexist with genuine causation in our world. But for the rest of us, both funda-
mental laws, and the idea that they may be fully deterministic, remain live meta-
physical possibilities.6 For us, then, what would these laws have to be like? Two
features that the true laws seem likely to have will be important for what follows.
First, these laws will be mainly, if not totally, local and microscopic in charac-
ter, stating constraints on the behaviors of the smallest bits of stuff that exist, and
building up conclusions concerning macro-scale happenings out of those con-
straints. Field theories such as GTR and QFT have this character; so does statistical
mechanics, in both classical and quantum forms. True, there may be some global
constraints supplementing the local-interaction laws, e.g., perhaps a law that states
that the total mass-energy, or the total angular momentum, in all of spacetime sums
up to a certain value.7 But the action in the laws, so to speak, will mainly be found
at a local and microscopic level. By “local” here I do not mean to exclude such
things as Newtonian gravity, taken as an action-at-a-distance, but rather laws that
mention, or directly govern (so to speak) macro-scale objects, independent of their
constituents. So, for example, the fundamental laws of nature are not likely to
include things such as: “All ravens are black” or “No gold sphere is greater than 1
km in diameter.” Such constraints as there are (most likely there are few or none)
concerning the sizes of gold spheres and the colors of raven plumage will arise out
of laws governing basic micro-kinds of things, together with historical and contin-
gent conditions built into the meaning of expressions like “gold” and “raven”. 
A more serious example of a non-micro, non-local law would be the second law
of thermodynamics. This brings us to the second feature of possible deterministic
laws for our world that needs to be mentioned. The 2nd law and other “phenomeno-
logical” laws have tended to be seen, since the definitive victory of atomism (in its
various quantum guises), as merely expressing overwhelmingly likely behaviors in
certain circumstances, rather than behaviors mandated by fundamental law. We
believe that entropy-reducing evolutions do occur sometimes for small, isolated
systems, and we believe larger-scale anti-entropic behavior to be possible, if unlike-
ly to be observed.8
In general, our two features to keep in mind say: macro-scale phenomena
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7 Such laws have been toyed with for variants of General Relativity, most commonly setting the
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emerge from micro-scale initial conditions and interactions. And while certain
dependable regularities seem to emerge at the macro-level, in fact what will occur
in any given case depends on the precise initial conditions and external (boundary)
influences that occur; and if the initial and boundary conditions are just so, many
rather weird and uncanny outcomes may be determined and may occur, without any
breakdown of determinism’s grip.
So much for determinism and deterministic laws. What do I mean by “genuine
causation”? The full answer to this is to be found in the next three sections, where
I look at what I take to be the three most prominent accounts of causality that
deserve to be called “genuine”. At a minimum, genuine causation should include the
paradigmatic cases of causal talk in everyday life, not merely events at the level of
particles or spacetime points. And the point of talking about genuine causation is,
of course, to contrast it with some lesser sorts of causation, metaphysically innocu-
ous and, correspondingly, obviously applicable to events in our world. For exam-
ple, imagine that a deeply empiricist philosopher says “Of course there is causation
in our world, for all that is required for causation is a bit of semi-dependable regu-
larity and the interest of some human onlookers. Basically, ‘C causes E’ is true if
C’s are usually followed by E’s, and humans can sometimes bring C about as a tool
for bringing about E.” If this is all that one means by ‘causation’ or ‘causality’, then
these notions clearly can exist in harmony with determinism – at least, if determin-
ism is in fact a possibility for our world, as we are assuming.
Genuine causation is something stronger than roughly reliable regularity; it is
meant to be metaphysically substantive. In particular, it must involve a non-trivial
degree of modal involvement to the meaning of causal claims. But exactly what sort
of modal involvement? Below we will look at three sorts of answer to this question,
and check whether causation, so understood, can coexist with determinism. Before
beginning, there remains just one other view of causation to mention in passing:
non-reductive causal fundamentalism. This is the view that there is genuine causa-
tion, that it is a fundamental part of the correct metaphysical world view, and that it
cannot be reduced to or analyzed in terms of any other notions. In particular, this
sort of fundamentalist will resist even the minimal conceptual commitments we will
see below: for example, a commitment to the claim that whenever a genuine cause
C occurs, at least the probability of E must be thereby increased; or that, given that
c caused e, then it is true that if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred. What
philosophers subscribe to such a view of causation? I will not name names. But I
fear that the ranks of such philosophers are growing, in part because of the failures
of all philosophical analyses of causation proposed to date. Against these philoso-
phers, my argument will not be able to gain a foothold. This is not surprising, for in
the view of such philosophers, the causal relation is a kind of magical linkage,
something we allegedly recognize all over the place, but which resists translation
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into any other conditions, terms or notions. Rather than indulging in mystery-mon-
gering, I would urge these philosophers to adopt an appropriate anti-realist attitude
towards causation. But that is a battle for another day.
1.  Genuine Causation: Mackie’s analysis
There is a centuries-old tradition of trying to understand causation in terms of
either necessity, or sufficiency, or both. This tradition reached its maximum devel-
opment in John Mackie’s INUS-condition analysis of causation.9 The analysis is
meant to capture a non-probabilistic, traditional notion of causation: given that the
cause occurs, the effect has to follow; or, as we often also think, had the cause not
occurred, then the effect would not have ensued (other things being equal; the cause
was necessary in the circumstances). Now Mackie himself was an empiricist, and
at one stage at least he wanted to translate these modalities into empiricist-friendly
facts about what happens always or never, in the actual world. I would argue that
the attempt to make the account empiricist-friendly failed, but we can set aside that
issue for our purposes. As I noted above, we are only interested in views of causa-
tion with genuine modal involvement. Since we are assuming the existence of laws
(deterministic laws, in fact), we may as well say that the necessity here is physical
necessity: i.e., for the effect not to have followed would have involved a violation
of one or more law of nature.
An INUS condition is an insufficient, but necessary part of an unnecessary, but
sufficient condition for a given event-type to occur. Let’s take a simple traditional
example like: striking the match caused it to light. This is not the only way to get a
match to light; one can also insert it into an existing flame, for example. So while
striking the match (plus other factors) may be sufficient for the lighting to ensue, it
is not necessary; it is one of several cause-complexes (i.e. conjunctions of events
and/or circumstances) that are each unnecessary but sufficient to bring about the
lighting of the match. Focussing on the striking itself, a moment’s thought reveals
that rubbing the match along the strike-board is not sufficient all by itself. If we do
this in a vacuum chamber, no lighting will occur. So there must be oxygen around.
And the match had better be dry. And so on: the true, sufficient cause is a long string
of jointly-occuring circumstances or events, with the striking being just one mem-
ber of the list – albeit, a necessary one. Let’s not overwork our imaginations, and
let’s suppose that a proper sufficient condition for the match lighting is this: <strike,
dry, oxygen present>. Each of the three elements here is an INUS condition for the
match lighting – and indeed, in the right context at least, it is possible to imagine
each of them as being singled out, for explanatory purposes, as the cause of the
match’s lighting. 
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So far, so good; but philosophers do have very good imaginations. The oxygen
had better not be present in the form of a high wind; the air pressure had better not
be too low or too high; the match had better not be about to be doused by water, as
soon as the striking ends, and so on. There would seem to be an unlimited number
of strange ways in which the three elements of our putatively-sufficient condition
might be present, and yet the striking fail to produce a lit match. So we face an ugly
choice. Either we accept that the true US conditions are arbitrarily long and not ever
fully specifiable by us – which seems to render belief in genuine INUS conditions
almost a matter of faith; or we lump together all the weird absences-of-preventers
that we need, and say they are excluded by the “causal field”, which is a catch-all
condition that ensures that nothing abnormal is present, about to occur, etc. The
catch-all is a problem for the analysis: it cannot be taken literally as meaning “and
nothing that is a preventer of E is present”, since ‘preventer’ is a fully causal notion,
and its introduction here makes the account circular. But if instead we take the
catch-all to be simply an element saying that “circumstances are normal”, then one
worries whether something this vague can be admitted as part of the analysis. (One
also worries, of course, that “normal” here is just a sneaky way of excluding pre-
venters without saying so outright.) 
This is all fairly familiar material so far – but how does determinism affect the
picture? The answer can be seen after we divide reasons why a putative US condi-
tion may fail into two types of enemy: the enemy from without, and the enemy from
within. The kinds of problems we have dealt with so far, and which Mackie’s causal
field are meant to exclude, all count as enemies from without. But if microscopic-
level determinism reigns, then in many cases we need to exclude the enemy from
within: microscopic initial- and boundary-conditions that are just perverted and
“atypical” enough to entail the non-production of the usual effect. 
Philosophers of statistical mechanics talk about these sorts of things quite often.
Given just the right initial and boundary conditions, that ice cube in your gin and
tonic may grow bigger, and the liquid hotter. Or the end result of stirring the drink
may be to leave the gin and the tonic in separate layers, as a matter, we might say,
of “accident” or “bad luck” – but in fact, as a simple consequence of the initial con-
ditions and boundary conditions that held when you began stirring. These sorts of
things are fantastically unlikely, and we probably don’t see any in our lifetimes. But
the conceptual point still stands: because of micro-determinism of the type likely to
hold in our complex world, in most cases there are no US conditions for a given
macro-level effect, and hence no INUS conditions. If the macro-level US condition
proposed supervenes on the “wrong” initial conditions, and equally “wrong” bound-
ary conditions obtain in the relevant environment, then all sorts of weird things may
take place, including the failure of the customary effect E to ensue. 
A few points are worth noting here. First, the anti-thermodynamic behavior
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examples mentioned above are just examples of what the “wrong” initial conditions
can produce; the undesired outcome need not be a violation of the 2nd law, and
indeed, may involve domains where the categories of thermodynamics are not
applicable to begin with. The anti-thermodynamic examples are just one salient
type of problem that bad initial conditions may produce, one already widely dis-
cussed in the philosophy of physics. Second, it is also not clear that the mischief that
bad initial conditions can cause is always highly improbable, unlikely to be
observed in our lifetimes. Going back to the match-striking: how often have you
struck a match, watched sparks fly, and watched as the match fails to light? Often,
if you buy the same brand of matches as me! This can happen when the match is
dry, when there is no wind, when the force of the strike is sufficient (judging by
other occasions when it was), etc. Why does the match sometimes not light?
Perhaps the only real explanation, for a given occasion, will have to advert to what
happened at the microscopic level. The initial and boundary conditions just weren’t
such as to entail the match lighting up; and moreover, that might be true of about
30% of the strikings that share an identical macro-level description. Why didn’t the
US condition lead to the effect? The only answer may be “the enemy from with-
in”.10
If this is right, no band-aid can be brought in to fix the account, as we did when
we invoked the causal field to exclude the enemies from without. Suppose we add
a secondary causal field assumption: “... and the initial conditions and boundary
conditions underlying all these factors are not such as to lead to E’s non-occur-
rence.” The circle is now complete! In fact, we can throw away C and its mates in
our original proposed US condition, and just keep the final clause: assuming deter-
ministic laws, if the local initial and boundary conditions are such as to not entail
the non-occurrence of E, then these conditions actually entail the occurrence of E.
But then our original macro-level elements like <strike, dry, oxygen present, . . .>
are no longer INUS conditions, because they are not necessary after all. In short, the
INUS condition analysis has broken down completely. If genuine causation exists
in our world, its nature must be explicated some other way, for genuine INUS con-
ditions and micro-deterministic laws are incompatible.
Returning to the match-striking example, one thing that might occur to us
immediately is that the problem I have highlighted for Mackie’s analysis is precise-
ly the sort of problem that drove many philosophers, in the early 1970s, to develop
accounts of probabilistic causation. Striking the match doesn’t guarantee its light-
ing, no matter how you specify the macro-conditions; but surely it at least raises the
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probability of lighting occuring? We will come back to this below as our third and
final type of account of genuine causation. Before going probabilistic, we must
explore a different sort of account, meant to be compatible with determinism:
Lewis’ counterfactual analysis.
2.  Lewis’ analysis
The original Lewis (1973) account of causation can be thought of as a schema
for analyses based on counterfactuals; the details of what counterfactuals are, what
their truth conditions are, how to analyze direct versus indirect causation, singular
vs generic causation, and so on, are not fully fleshed out. The fully fleshed out
Lewisian story about causation arguably does not give us genuine causation,
because it is too Humean-empiricist. Lewis’ official ontological picture insists that
the panoply of events that occur in world history are all fully “distinct existences”,
a la Hume, and that the facts about laws and about causation strongly supervene on
this panoply of intrinsically disconnected facts. But we do not need to enter into
arguments here about whether Lewis’ ontology ultimately supports genuine laws,
and genuine causation, or not. As with Mackie above, since we are already assum-
ing the existence of genuine, deterministic laws of nature, we can also help our-
selves to the modalities and counterfactuals that rest on these laws. 
Here is a greatly oversimplified statement of Lewis’ account of causation. If c
and e are both events that actually occur, and it is true that if c had not occurred,
then e would not have occurred either, then c is a cause of e. If c and e are not actu-
ally occurring events, but it is a true counterfactual claim that if c had occurred, then
e would have occurred, then again we can say that c is a cause (would have been a
cause) of e. 
Lewis’ account has great surface plausibility. Very often, the reason we say that
some thing c caused another thing e is precisely because we judge that, had c not
occurred, then e would not have ensued. How do we judge this? Typically, we try
to imagine what the situation would have been like without c, but with everything
else held as near to the way it actually is as possible, and then consider whether in
those circumstances, the unfolding of events in accordance with the laws of nature
would have led to e’s not occurring. 
But in making these judgments, we do not grind through calculations using a
putative set of deterministic differential equations plus initial and boundary condi-
tions. Instead, we use common sense and physical intuition, hoping that our conclu-
sions do indeed track what the true, deterministic laws entail. The problem, then, is
this: the deterministic laws, in most cases, probably do not entail a single possible
outcome! The enemy from within will strike us here too. If the initial and boundary
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conditions of our hypothesized not-c situation are just so, the laws may entail that
e comes about anyway – at least, for a wide range of cases we typically classify as
cases of cause/effect. And turning to the case where c and e do not actually occur,
it will be even more obvious that in certain cases, if the microscopic initial and
boundary conditions are “wrong ones”, then in the counterfactual situation in which
c does occur, e will fail to occur.
In other words, if the facts about which counterfactuals are true and which false
are based on what the deterministic microphysical laws entail, then they do not give
us unequivocal results very often. There will be a set of possible micro-states com-
patible with our not-c posit that lead to not-e, and a different set of micro-states,
equally compatible with not-c and presumably macroscopically indistinguishable
from the other set, that lead to e. Intuitively, we want to say that the latter set will
be a set of “less likely” conditions, or that it will have “measure zero” compared to
the normal-results set. Below we will come back to whether this response can save
the day; first, let’s consider a couple of examples. 
Let’s return to our example of the match that lit. Suppose it had not been struck
– surely it is clear that it would not have lit? At the level of intuitive common sense,
yes; at the level of deterministic microphysics, the answer is not so clear.
Spontaneous combustion is known to happen, and although it never happens to
ordinary matches in our experience, this “never” is presumably much like the
“never” of “ice never grows larger in a drink”. Moreover, we may consider a con-
text in which a different causal claim is at issue. After many failed attempts to strike
a match, my daughter finally does it firmly enough and gets a match lit. I say: “See:
you have to strike with enough force! If you had struck the match a bit less force-
fully, it wouldn’t have lit.” I thereby signal that I think the rough strike-strength as
having caused the match to light, in contrast with weaker strike-strengths that have
been employed on previous occasions. But in this case, our enemy from within
doesn’t need to make the match light spontaneously, but rather only make the match
light from a less-than-actual-strength strike. The set of microscopic initial condi-
tions and boundary conditions that would lead to that happening may be a very big
set indeed. Or to change examples, suppose I see a feather delicately balanced on
the edge of the table, swaying like a see-saw. A sudden small gust of wind blows it
off the table. I say to my friend that the gust of wind caused the feather to fall. But
here too, it is not so clear that the enemy from within might not have done exactly
the same job, without the gust being present. Perhaps only very normal, tiny micro-
gusts, such as happen all the time in a room of “still” air, would have sufficed, and
lots of possible “no-sudden-gust” initial and boundary conditions would have led to
precisely that outcome.
My claim is that these enemy-from-within examples show us that a world gov-
erned by micro-deterministic laws is a world where all sorts of outcomes are com-
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possible with a specified macroscopic set of fixed conditions. And as for Mackie’s,
this fact causes big problems for Lewis’ analysis of causation. The intuitively cor-
rect counterfactual consequence is only guaranteed if we restrict the counterfactual
micro-conditions allowable to those guaranteed to deliver the right result; but that
is cheating. The only general assertion we can make about what would have hap-
pened, had certain macro-conditions been different, is this: lots of different things
might have occurred, and which would occur depends completely on the detailed
micro-conditions with which we replace the actual situation.
Let’s now return to the objection that while these enemy-from-within cases are
indeed nomologically possible, they are so rare, improbable, unlikely etc., that we
can set them aside as irrelevant to the truth conditions of our counterfactuals. There
are two problems with this reply. First, I tried to give cases where it is not at all clear
that the “enemy” initial conditions are greatly less likely than the “normal” ones
(the softly-struck match), or where in fact it may be that the “enemy” conditions
arguably are more numerous than the “correct-result” conditions (the feather case).
The latter is perhaps a borderline case of overdetermination, and a defender of
Lewis’ analysis might be prepared to agree that there is no clear causal fact in that
case. 
More to the point, though, I don’t think that taking refuge in the “unlikeliness”
of certain sorts of initial and boundary conditions is automatically meaningful. It is
true that for many models of deterministic physical systems (notably, a gas of
Newtonian particles in a box), there seems to be a natural measure to impose (or a
range of suitable, natural measures) on volumes of phase space, and if we then
equate volume with probability, we get the desired result that weirdness-producing
initial conditions are “unlikely”. But great care must be taken in using the everyday
notion of probability in such abstruse, many-worlds scenarios. Are we to imagine
God throwing some quadrillion-sided dice to decide which initial and boundary
conditions to use, when setting up our not-c world? Many philosophers, myself
included, object to the exportation of the probability concept to extravagant meta-
physical domains outside of the actual world. 
Furthermore, Lewis’ own definition of the truth conditions for counterfactuals
does not square easily with this proposed fix of the problem. Lewis says:
A ¨®C : the proposition that if A were true, the C would also be true. The operation
¨® is defined by a rule of truth, as follows. A ¨®C is true (at a world w) iff either (1)
there are no possible A-worlds (in which case A ¨®C is vacuous), or (2) some A-world
where C holds is closer (to w) than is any A-world where C does not hold. In other
words, a counterfactual is nonvacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actual-
ity to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the
antecedent true without the consequent. (1973, p. 560).
Carl Hoefer Causality and Determinism
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2004): 99-115 
109
Hoefer.qxd  02/12/2004  13:44  Página 109
Evidently, to get the right counterfactuals coming out true in the face of the
enemy from within, we will have to maintain that some “normal” world is closer to
actuality than is any “enemy” world. But closer in what way, and for what reason?
By hypothesis, they are macroscopically identical to each other, up to the point of
the non-occurrence of c. We can’t say that the enemy world is further away from
reality because it involves a very improbable transition taking place; the actual
world, and pretty much any possible world like it in complexity, is a world where
very improbable transitions take place. 
I don’t want to explore the argumentative options further here, and will rest my
case hoping to have shown that there is at least a tension between the counterfactu-
al account of genuine causation, and the way events may unfold under determinis-
tic laws. Stepping back to view the problem at a distance, we may put it like this:
in a world where micro-determinism reigns, specifying the presence or absence of
a macroscopic condition doesn’t entail much, if anything, about what subsequent
events may look like.11
3.  Probabilistic causation
Just as philosophers turned to probabilistic causation in the 1970s after the fail-
ures of traditional accounts, so do we here, to see whether a less rigid notion of cau-
sation fares better in terms of compatibility with determinism.
At first blush it may strike some as strange to even spend time discussing a form
of causation that is obviously in contradiction with determinism from scratch. And
it is certainly true that some kinds of probabilistic causation that might be contem-
plated are incompatible with determinism. A view that takes probabilistic causation
to exist if and only if there are genuinely probabilistic, i.e. stochastic fundamental
laws of nature, would be one such. But that is not the only way to understand prob-
abilistic causation,12 and we should not assume that determinism entails that there
are no non-trivial objective probabilities in the world.13
Strongly empiricist views can be ruled out straight away, however, as not offer-
ing genuine causation. If one takes probabilities to be simply reasonably-stable
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11 It might appear that a natural move at this stage, to save a counterfactual analysis, would be to
back away from -c ¨®-e as the crucial counterfactual, and instead say something like: -c ¨®P(-e)
> P@(-e). See for example Schaffer (2001). I will briefly touch on the kind of problem such an account
would face, in the next section. 
12 Nor even an obviously interesting way: how do we build up from stochastic fundamental laws
to probabilistic causes and effects at the macro-level? If something like ordinary quantum mechanics
is true, do its probabilities have any obvious relation to the probability of getting headache relief if one
takes an aspirin?
13 I argue this point at length in Hoefer (unpublished).
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actual frequencies, and takes Prob(Contract Malaria|Sprayed Swamps) > P(Contract
Malaria|Not-Sprayed Swamps) – perhaps along with some other conditions
designed to rule out spurious correlations – to be the kind of thing we mean when
we say that spraying swamps causes a reduction in malaria, then one has a view that
is perfectly at home in a deterministic world. What such a theory is, of course, is the
probabilistic extension of a naïve Humean regularity account of causation, and like
its brother, it is not what most philosophers would call a robust, genuine form of
causation.14
So if we are to have genuine probabilistic causation that is compatible with
determinism, we want our probabilities such as P(E|C) to be appropriately modal
and non-accidental. In other words, we need to postulate something like stable
propensities or causal capacities that are possessed by certain objects or systems,
propensities or capacities that supervene on the micro-physics (and contingent-but-
stable features of the world), without necessarily being explicitly reducible to those
features. I will break the discussion of this idea into two parts: first, assuming that
these causal capacities have a fixed, intrinsic strength, at least if the causal condi-
tions are adequately spelled out; and second, assuming that the capacities do not
have fixed and stable strengths. 
The former sort of account claim will claim that it is true in general that 
P(E|C) > P(E|-C), at least in a range of contexts where other causal factors for
E are held fixed; and for at least one (perhaps more, perhaps for all) clearly express-
ible type of causal set-up, there is a determinate probability x for the production of
the effect.15 We can use another cliché’d example here, such as: P(lung cancer with-
in 10 years|smoke 2 packs a day) = 0.232.16 Or, to return to our matches:
P(lights|brand X, dry, no wind, strike-strength L) = 0.5. In general: P(E|Full-C) = x.
Unfortunately, in a world of micro-determinism, the sensitivity of outcomes to
particularities of the micro-level initial and boundary conditions is in conflict with
the hoped-for stable strength of the causal capacities. Both the enemy from within
and the enemy from without are relevant here. Take the latter sort of problem first.
If there are enough microscopic black holes whizzing through space, and if they
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14 I choose this example because it is one used by Nancy Cartwright in her famous paper “Causal
Laws and Effective Strategies”. In that paper Cartwright does advocate a simple frequentist account
of probability, but the point of her argument is to show that the “other conditions” needed to rule out
spurious correlations cannot be captured within the constraints of Humean empiricism. Extending the
view and arguments in subsequent works (esp. (1989)), Cartwright later appears to advocate a form of
irreducible singular probabilistic causation (one of the irreducible fundamentalist views mentioned
earlier). For some problems with her 1983 arguments, see Hoefer (2004).
15 What we have in mind here is something like one of Mackie’s US conditions, but now instead
of being sufficient for the ensuing of the effect, the set of conditions is sufficient to produce E, with
objective probability x. 
16 The number here is made up, so smokers need not panic. On second thought, they should go
ahead and panic.
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happen to frequently collide with match-heads as they are being struck, the rate
(actual frequency) at which striking will produce a lit match may be different than
what it would be with few or no such collisions.17 But we don’t need exotic things
like black holes; micro-gusts of wind will do just as well. The moral here is that the
actual frequencies of E-outcomes after C-conditions may depend on a lot of factors
and influences extrinsic to what we normally take to be the relevant parts of the C-
conditions. As we saw in discussing the problems for Mackie’s analysis, it may be
unrealistic to suppose that there is, in principle, a completable list of factors that
should be excluded. In other words, “Full-C” probably does not exist, in most cases.
But let’s suppose that we are allowed to stipulate a proper-shielding condition
that takes care of such unwanted influences; the actual frequencies may indeed fluc-
tuate, and fail to be “right”, when such influences are operative. Then the account
of probabilistic causation we are looking at claims that, for systems properly shield-
ed, when C obtains there is a definite, objective probability of E being produced –
the “true” probability, as opposed to the actual frequencies that may obtain in our
improperly shielded world. Here the enemy from within strikes, undermining the
notion that any such “true” probability P(E|Full-C, Shielding) really exists.We
know that in general, it is the actual micro initial conditions and boundary condi-
tions that determine, on a given Full-C-occasion, whether E results or not. So for
some range of IC/BCs an E-outcome occurs, and for (most of) the rest of the possi-
ble IC/BCs, E does not occur, and in our world members of the former set occur,
stably and reliably, in about 100(x)% of Full-C cases. 
It is clear, though, that this proportion could have been different, with exactly
the same laws and exactly the same “causal facts” (other than the alleged strength
of Full-C) had the contingent facts about IC’s and BC’s been different. Even more
easily, the frequency distribution of E given Full-C might have failed to be stable
and reliable. And yet, evidently, nothing about the nature of C, or E, or the real rela-
tionship that sometimes connects them, would thereby be any different. In other
words, the alleged genuine causality we set out to explore, has turned out not to be
genuine after all: it has no modal robustness, and in the end turns out to be just
another empiricist-acceptable variant of the rough-regularity account of causa-
tion.18
Carl Hoefer Causality and Determinism
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2004): 99-115
112
17 The idea here is that these collisions occur, in fact, more frequently than do collisions with
other similar-sized objects, and for no particular reason (i.e., as a contingent accidental by-product of
the actual initial and boundary conditions). If you don’t like micro black holes, substitute alpha parti-
cles or other invisible death rays.
18 It may be supposed that one can appeal to a “natural” distribution of IC’s and BC’s on some-
thing like thermodynamic & Stat Mech grounds, to shore up the idea that a certain probability x
emerges naturally from the physical situation of shielded Full-C, whereas other values could only
result and be stable in virtue of “weird coincidences” or “conspiratorial IC’s” and suchlike. For sim-
ple problem set-ups like shielded coin-flippers or gases in boxes and so forth – i.e., for problems that
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We can deal with the second sort of account, that does not even postulate a
given intrinsic strength to the probabilistic causation relation, quickly: it begins
where the previous account was forced to end up. Without fixed, true probabilities
of E given Full-C’s, probabilities that somehow follow from the nature of C and E
(and perhaps other factors, such as the laws), what this account of causation says is
basically this: C’s sometimes help give rise to E’s, though there is no further clari-
fication of the relationship that we can give, except perhaps on a case-by-case basis.
Such a position, plausible in the extreme, is not the sort of genuine causation that
we set out to explore.19
4. Conclusion
My goal was to show that genuine causation – causation of a robust metaphys-
ical type, with some genuine modal component, and applicable at the level of ordi-
nary events – is either in tension with, or in outright conflict with, the supposition
of underlying determinism. Perhaps the tension can be overcome with an elabora-
tion of a Lewis-style counterfactual account, perhaps using counterfactual probabil-
ities rather than certainties; but the considerations of the last section go against such
a hope. In a world of micro-determinism, there may be objective probabilities, but
they are hostage to the facts about distributions of initial- and boundary-conditions,
and this undercuts their ability to serve as the foundation of genuine causal rela-
tions.
We saw that standard analyses of causation face problems of the enemy from
without sometimes, and of the enemy from within always. In a rich and complex
world such as ours, with few or no macro-regularities of a robust and exceptionless
kind, the relations between macroscopic things or circumstances supervene on the
actual micro-facts, and so those relations can be (fairly) reliable, useful, controllable
and so forth – but they can’t be metaphysically fundamental.
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have a uniform micro-description that we can handle with physical theory – this claim will sometimes
be plausible. But unlike “rigid rectangular box of volume V with a Newtonian gas of identical parti-
cles in a M-B distribution at temperature T”, “Smokes 2 packs a day, . . .” has no canonical distribu-
tion of micro-descriptions; and the boundary conditions (i.e. external influences, at the micro-level)
are even less plausibly regimentable. There is just no reason to suppose that one set of micro-states of
males-smoking-2-packs-daily+environment counts as “normal”, “probable” or what have you, while
another one does not. 
19 We arrive here at the doors of a mechanism-based account of causation (see Glennan (1996)).
Since mechanisms work because of the dependable relations of their parts or sub-processes, and these
are either (a) further mechanisms, (b) brute causal relationships, or (c) reducible/derivable from the
laws of nature, the logical terrain for our purposes does not change at all. Mechanisms only salvage
genuine causation if their smallest sub-parts end up involving brute causal relationships, and if those
relationships are to count as genuine causation, presumably they must be understood in something like
one of the ways discussed in the text above.
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Throughout, I have been looking at views of causation that locate it, at least in
part, at the macro-level: gusts knocking down feathers, smoke causing cancers, and
so on. But the defender of causation could accept the fragility of (what we call)
causal relations at the macro-level, and yet insist that there is indeed genuine cau-
sation in our world – in the fundamental laws governing the micro-things, them-
selves. This is a view strongly supported by Nancy Cartwright’s work on laws in
physics: the Schrödinger equation tells us, among other things, how the capacities
of a charge-bearing object work (say, a proton) cause a distinct charged object (say,
a captive electron) to behave. In general, looking at the fundamental physical theo-
ries we have in hand, Cartwright and others argue that they are through-and-through
stories about the causal powers of things. Other philosophers, such as Huw Price
and myself, are uneasy with such a construal. 
Fortunately or not, this debate cannot be settled using current knowledge. Are
there really any true, exceptionless fundamental physical laws? If so, are they mere
regularities, or necessary truths, or statements of causal powers? These questions
can only be answered if or when progress in physics clarifies whether a true funda-
mental physics is possible for our world. In the meantime, we have good reason to
suspect that if such laws do exist, and are deterministic, then genuine causation at
the level of ordinary events is at best a fragile, pragmatically useful epiphenome-
non.
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